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Modeling Interregional Migration in Differentiating the Characteristics of One Local Public Service
Modeling Interregional Migration in Differentiating the Characteristics of One Local Public Service
Annotation

The heterogeneous nature of the preferences of citizens living in different economic zones creates difficulties for the state in meeting the needs of the population in local public services. American economist W. Oates, studying this problem, derived a theorem on decentralization, according to which it is advisable to assign responsibility for the provision of local public services to local governments. With a decentralized approach, local communities independently determine the parameters of their own basket of public services. This condition creates a situation of choice for citizens: each individual can “vote with their feet” for one or another jurisdiction. This is the essence of Tiebout hypothesis, the study of which is the subject of this paper. The article proposes an agent-based model that simulates the process of inter-regional population migration. Agent-based approach is a relatively new area of simulation. Its essence lies in the representation of complex processes as aggregates of agents interacting with each other and with the environment. Each agent has an individual objective function, which he seeks to maximize (minimize) according to established rules. From the set of actions and interactions of agents, the global dynamics of a system is born that is of particular interest for research. The active agents in the proposed model are individuals with unique demand functions for each public service. Regions - passive agents - aggregate the functions of the demand of individuals. Regional equilibria for each public service are formed from the ratio of aggregate demand functions and regional supply functions. Moving between regions, individuals are looking for the best option for the combination of prices and production volumes of services. Migration through a change in the ratios of aggregated demand functions is reflected in the parameters of regional equilibria, which creates a new situation of choice for individuals.  

About authors
Ruslan Ramazanov
Ufa federal research center of the Russian academy of sciences
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