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Aggregation of voting designs
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33 Экономика. Народное хозяйство. Экономические науки
Date of publication
04.09.2020
Public year
2020
DOI
10.31857/S042473880010524-5
Aggregation of voting designs
Annotation

A Condorcet domain (a domain of linear orders where the majority rule does not violate the transitivity) can be considered as a ground (or design) of organizing a voting procedure. In the present paper we make a next step, namely, we discuss an organization of choices among designs. Here we restrict ourselves by considering those Condorcet domains that are produced with the help of rhombus tilings. Our main result asserts that the majority rule correctly aggregates designs which are produced by use of cubillages, which are three-dimensional generalizations of rhombus tilings. More precisely, to every cubillage  we associate a superdomain  of designs and give an aggregation rule  on this superdomain. We show that the resulting aggregated tiling (design) always belongs to the same superdomain. Also we show that such rules  are agreeable within the intersection of superdomains.

About authors
Vladimir Danilov
Principal Scientific Researcher
Central Economics and Matthematics Institute, Russian Academy of Sciences
Aleksandr Karzanov
Chief scientific researcher
Central Economics and Mathematics Institute, Russian Academy of Sciences
Gleb Koshevoy
Institute for Information Transmission Problems of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Kharkevich Institute)
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