18.97.14.82
Kantian Appearances, Intentional Objects, and Some Varieties of Phenomenalism (Translation: M. Belousov)
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1 ФИЛОСОФИЯ. ПСИХОЛОГИЯ
Date of publication
06.07.2020
Public year
2020
DOI
10.18254/S271326680010187-6
Kantian Appearances, Intentional Objects, and Some Varieties of Phenomenalism (Translation: M. Belousov)
Annotation

The aim is to develop some new alternatives for a phenomenalistic reading of Kant. Although the concern is ultimately with empirically real objects, I begin with a reading of the Aesthetic and the notion of appearances as at least possibly of empirically real objects. Employing Husserlian terminology, I take these to be the “noematic correlate” of a fundamental mode of directedness borne by an (at least initially) purely aesthetic “noesis.” From here, and with a new reading of Kant’s discussion of the “transcendental object = X,” new possibilities open for a sense in which even a phenomenalistic Kant might – without regarding them as also existing in themselves – regard empirically real objects as more than mere “logical constructs” out of the Aesthetic’s “appearances.”

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Richard Aquila
University of Tennessee
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