The objects of study are digital transaction platforms. The aim of the research is to analyze the economic phenomenon of digital transaction platforms, to reveal its main features and to explore the environment that ensures the economic efficiency of this business model. The authors offer their own definition of a digital transaction platform, the taxonomy of its types as well as the analysis of correlation between business areas and methods of cost-benefit distribution.
The paper presents a new mathematical economic model of a platform with three groups of agents – suppliers, visitors (potential customers) and advertisers. Unlike its predecessors, the model takes into consideration a large number of interconnections in the behaviour of suppliers, customers and advertisers, focuses on calculation of the payback period of a platform instead of maximizing the current income of the platform operator, applies logistic functions for describing the network effect of the relationships between the number of transactions and the number of sellers, the number of sellers and the number of transactions in the previous period, the price of advertising space and the number of users.
The authors reveal the main principles of pricing management for platform services and show that the payback opportunity largely depends on the pace of accumulation and exhaustion of network effects – thus, the forecast of expansion of network effects is very likely to be wrong.
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